






































Two concepts of virtual reality are competing in the cyber world, virtual reality as total 
adaptability and virtual reality as the simulation of possible worlds. Virtuality as 
adaptability in industrial production leads to a closer consideration of individual con-
sumer demand and to de-massified production. It implies a stronger reference of pro-
duction to the reality of consumer needs. The aesthetic concept of virtual reality as pos-
sible words and fictional realities can imply a loss of reality. Both concepts of virtuality 
interact, however. Adaptive production needs the experimentation of imagined and 
simulated possible worlds. Virtual reality leads to a disembodiment of experience and to 
the danger of the loss of the validation of perception by experience. The concept of the 
virtual is originally a concept of theological origin, signifying invisible but real potenti-
ality or a reality that is real only as potentiality. One of the most important innovations 
of the virtual reality of the internet has taken place in financial markets in online trading 
and online brokerage. The virtual reality of the internet financial markets enables large 
strata of the population to participate in stock market speculation, leading to a kind of 
people’s capitalism. Problems caused by the virtual character of the transactions in 
online trading are the churning of traders and the over-trading of shares by investors.    
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I. Two Concepts of Virtuality 
In the discussion on the concept of virtuality two different meanings of virtual are 
used: ‘Virtual’ means on the one hand the immediately possible, the being effective in 
concealment, the powerful but not visible, and on the other hand what is only seemingly 
existent and possible only in play or in fiction. There are used here quite different mean-
ings of the virtual if virtual is on the one hand what is only seemingly true and on the 
other hand what is possible in an emphatic sense as the powerful. In the history of ideas, 
virtual indicates something that is real as potentiality, that is not only potential as poten-
tial. It is potentially real as something that is in an intensified way possible. Behind the 
distinction of being real as a possible and of being possible as a possible lies the obser-
vation that possibility and reality are not clearly separated discrete states or description 
of states or modi of being. Potentiality and reality rather form, as Leibniz demonstrated, 
a continuum from the possible to the real.  
In a similar way, Schelling moved the idea of grades of the possible and virtual to the 
centre of his theory of the creative and of becoming in the theory of potencies or poten- 2
tialites in the last version of his philosophy, in his Positive Philosophy.1 In his theory of 
potencies, Schelling writes that the potencies are there before there is being. He devel-
ops a dialectics of different kinds of potencies and calls that which is able to be that 
which is closest to being, closest to that which is real. There are different consecutive 
states of potential being. Among these states of potential being, the potential being that 
is able to be immediately is the one that is the closest of the three potencies to being. It 
is almost about to transcend into being whereas there is potential being which is much 
further away from being. Schelling distinguishes between the above-being, the able-to-
be, and the being. The above-being moves through the able-to-be into being. That which 
is merely existent without all qualifications is at the same time that which is only possi-
ble, which is not yet being but above-being and before-being.  
The above-being, the merely existent has at the same time a theological meaning in 
Schelling. Philosophy must think the purely existent. It must start with pure existence. It 
cannot in contrast to Hegel’s theory of dialectics think that the pure nothingness is the 
beginning of a dialectic of becoming, of the transcendence from nothingness to being. 
We must start from the above-being, the merely existent without any concretization 
which then determines itself by way of the different modes of the possible into being.  
The idea that there exists something which is immediately before being, the potential 
or the able-to-be which is of all potencies or potentialities the one that is closest to being 
is useful not only for metaphysics but also for the cyberspace. In the cyberspace, there 
are two types of the virtual, two potentialities, first the potentiality or the able-to-be that 
is of all potentialities the one that is closest to being, and secondly the potential or able-
to-be that is only fictitious and far from being. The cyberspace is a space of the above-
being, of the possible before being. It is as well a space of the possible as the real which 
can be transformed at any time from the potential to the real as a space of the above-
being that is still far from being able to become real.  
The cyberspace is therefore not mere potentiality, but it is a specific, well-defined 
potentiality which can be transformed any time into being. The internet is a blueprint, a 
sketch of a technology which can be realised at once as reality. This function of the cy-
berspace as being a space of the economically possible as real or as the economically 
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feasible is of great significance for the virtual firm as Davidow and Malone have 
shown.2 The internet opens the possibility to the firm to create a space of the potential 
which is not only possible in an unspecified way and is not only mere, unspecified po-
tential but can be realised in real production at any time.  
From the economic concept of the virtuality of the internet we must distinguish the 
aesthetical interpretation of the cyberspace. The aesthetic concept of the internet and the 
cyberspace understands the internet as a space of the possible as the possible, as a space 
of the simulation of reality in which simulation in play and in fiction is central. 
It is necessary to distinguish between the aesthetical and the economic-technological 
and information-technological interpretation of the internet and of the electronic econ-
omy. Both interpretations understand the internet and the cyberspace as a space of the 
possible or potential. The difference is, however, considerable since the economy and 
firms are not interested in a general space of the possible, of simulation or of the virtual 
but in a space which can be transformed into reality at once and whose options are not 
at random, at will, or infinite, but are well-defined and tailored to the needs of the firm. 
Davidow and Malone are right to define the internet as an actual structure of infor-
mation and relationships that is not so much a medium of simulation but a concrete me-
dium or a medium of concretization. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the 
concept of virtuality that is at the foundations of the virtual firm, the ability to have a 
real systems technology in which the possible is real as the possible on the one hand, 
and the aesthetical concept of cyberspace in which the possible is possible as the possi-
ble. 
 
II. Virtuality as Adaptability in the Business Firm 
If one understands the virtual firm as a systems technology it is visible that the vir-
tual world is ambivalent for the freedom of the user. It expands the user’s options but it 
determines them also in detail. The problem can be analysed by recourse to the distinc-
tion between action and tool technology, machine technology and systems that Hubig 
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has introduced.3 The different forms of technology have different consequences for the 
problem of action, freedom, and justification of technology. The technology of using 
tools is effective on the level of actions and possesses a high freedom of valuation 
which is only concretised by giving objectives to the use of the tools as means. It also 
implies the ability to control the means and the objectives as well as one’s own abilities. 
It implies finally the control of reality by the individual.  
In contrast to the technology of using tools, the degree of freedom decreases in the 
case of the machine and the systems technology at the rate at which the degree of effec-
tiveness increases. In the technology of machines the objectives only are free and avail-
able but the connection between means and objectives is fixed by the construction of the 
machines. In the technology of machines, the goal of the technology is the availability 
and realisation of possibilities. The technological system and the systems technology fix 
even the objectives and the means of the systematic structure. Objectives and  means 
can only be chosen or rejected as a whole. The systems technology determines the con-
ditions for the use of tools and machines within an extended technological system of 
objectives-means-connections for the control of comprehensive problem situations. The 
infranet and internet of the virtual firm, its cyberspace, is a systems technology in 
which, in its ideal form, all possible options of the decision-maker are already premedi-
tated, structured, and cared for. The decision-maker has only the freedom to realise this 
or that option that is possible as real not options he might choose beyond those prepared 
for in the system. Or the decision-maker has the option not to use the system as a whole 
at all. The employees in a virtual firm cannot invent new options by themselves. They 
are given to them in the software.  
If one investigates the internet and the electronic economy according to the criteria of 
forms of technology and their different degrees of freedom it becomes visible that the 
internet is in a way the most universal system or net of information and relationships 
into which almost all information and relationships enter to an increasing degree. If with 
the increasing spread of systems technology the freedom decreases to use this technol-
ogy as a means or to choose oneself the objectives for which to use this technology, this 
must apply also to the internet. The functional relationship of the reliance on systems 
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and the decreasing freedom of setting one’s own objectives in using this technology and 
the decreasing freedom not to use it at all is effective also for the internet: The more the 
internet is in fact the most universal system of information and relationships the less I 
have the freedom not to participate in the internet. This development is the deeper con-
cern with the digital divide: It consists not primarily in distributional questions whether 
some people own a computer or not. The digital divide concerns the danger that the ex-
clusion from the internet will more and more imply the exclusion from the central me-
dia of communication. If the internet is the most universal system of communication I 
am outside of the realm of communication if I am not in the internet. The individual has 
no degree of freedom anymore in the question whether it can use the media internet or 
not. The individual must use the internet as the most universal and most effective media 
of communication to be part of social communication at all.4 
For this reason the internet needs to be free as the most universal and most effective 
media of communication. The postulate that there should be no censorship in the inter-
net is justified since the internet is not one media but it is the media. In the long run the 
internet will not be one media beside others but the universal media. As this universal 
media the internet is virtual not as a mere simulation or possible world but it is virtual as 
an invisible effective reality, as the reality of the possible, and not as the possibility of 
the possible. The cyberspace is not a virtual possibility but a virtual reality. The virtual 
firm is the user of this reality of the possible. The production of virtual products or the 
production of products with virtual means is the ideal form of a production in so far as it 
produces immediately and specifically in virtual reality. It must follow, however, the 
possibilities of the virtual reality as adaptive they might be. Production does not have 
great degrees of freedom from the media of the virtual possibilities given by the virtual 
reality of the firm. The production is determined by what is virtually real in the virtual 
reality. The virtual is the quality of something that can assume the qualities of many 
things. It is ascribed to a mode that is not real  and not possible but the reality of the 
possible. 
The concept of a virtual computer arose at the end of the 1950s in the context of ma-
chines that were fast enough that many people could work with them without having the 
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impression that they had to share the computer with others. Davidow and Malone claim 
that from this time the virtual is also understood as the adaptable or the interactive. Vir-
tual means here over-adapted, highly adapted to the client. For the user the virtual com-
puter was available at any place and any time and was therefore independent of time 
and space. It formed a virtual reality. Alvin Toffler introduced already in 1980 the idea 
of the “de-massified production”.5  
The precondition of the de-massification is, according to Toffler, that the develop-
ment of computers becomes possible which can produce one mega-instruction per sec-
ond at an acceptable price. The capacity of processing one mega-instruction per second 
had the price of one million Dollars in 1980. It was assumed in 1980 that the virtual 
production would become reality if this price of one million Dollars would fall to one 
hundred Dollars. This price of one hundred Dollars for one mega-instruction per second 
was reached at about 1992. 
If one summarises the theories of the virtual firm one comes to the conclusion that, in 
the firm, “virtual” means first of all adaptable. Virtuality is formulated in terms of 
maximal adaptability or adaptedness to reality. In a certain way, the normative character 
of the real enforces itself in the virtual firm through and despite the concept of the vir-
tual. It enforces the consideration of the real by the very fact that the virtual reality is 
not possible without the strict consideration of what the customer or consumer really 
wants. The normative reality of consumer demand is taken into account in the virtual 
firm even more than in the non-virtual firm. The customer demand is not replaced by 
simulations of this demand. Rather, the specificity of consumer demand is affirmed in a 
comprehensive way. The economic reality of the market is only perceived rightly by the 
firm if it is able to take up the needs of the customers in their specificity.  
The consideration of the specificity of the fulfilment of consumer needs by the vir-
tual production is, however, not the only problem of managing production. The firm 
must realise, at the same time, the economies of scale of mass production. The combina-
tion of individualisation and mass production is the truly revolutionary result of virtual 
production. The individualised mass production is the realisation of the synthesis of the 
opposites of individualisation and mass production.  
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Davidow and Malone point to the fact that this individualised mass production is 
most probably the origin of an increased stress in firms, a stress that is caused by the 
virtual production. The firm has to fulfil two parameters now: On the one hand it must 
reach high numbers of product units and cannot escape the compulsion to sell in great 
numbers, and at the same time the firm is forced to produce products that are oriented 
on the individual consumer. The production task does not become easier by the virtual 
production but more difficult. The tasks and demands on the employees become rather 
greater than smaller although the control of virtual production provides the firm with the 
means to deal with individualized consumer needs.  
 
III. Virtuality as Simulation: The Aesthetic Concept 
of Virtuality 
The economic concept of virtuality in production must be contrasted with the aes-
thetic concept of virtual reality. The aesthetic interpretation of virtual reality in contrast 
to the economic one can be found in a recent paper by Welsch. Welsch writes: “Thanks 
to our use of the medial realities we learn that reality has always been ... a construc-
tion.”6 The virtualisation in cyberspace causes a more virtual character of our everyday 
reality since it increases the virtual element as the fictitious and simulated element in 
our life. The increase of the virtual leads, according to Welsch, to the insight that reality 
as such is only a construction. One could reply that the thesis of the death of reality in 
cyberspace is strongly exaggerated. Particularly for the virtual firm, Welsch’s thesis is 
untenable. The virtualisation of production causes a less virtual or fictional considera-
tion of consumer demand since the reality of individual consumer demand becomes not 
less but more effective for the way in which goods are produced. Welsch himself quali-
fies, or even cancels, his own thesis when he says in the same book that a revalidating 
of reality happens through the virtualisation. He recognises that the thesis of the total 
dissolution of reality is not satisfying.  
The aesthetic concept of virtual reality implies the fictionalisation and simulation of 
reality. It interprets reality as the result of fictions, of individual and commonly shared 
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fictions. In the aesthetic concept of virtuality, virtual reality implies that reality itself 
becomes a fiction. Fictions are not understood as a specific form of poetic perception, as 
the poetic deepening, intensification, and transformation of reality but as that which 
constitutes reality.  
In a further step of reflection, the aesthetic and the economic concept of virtual real-
ity can, however, be synthesized. The contradiction between virtuality as simulation and 
virtuality as the potential of total adaptation to reality can be overcome if the comple-
mentarity of industrial and artistic production is considered. The virtual reality as the 
space of the possible constitutes a potential complementarity between the arts and busi-
ness. The arts are a field of experimentation of business in many industries: The arts 
develop new materials and designs. Virtual worlds precede in the arts their application 
in the mass production of industry.  
On the other hand, the tension between the two cultures of the arts and of industry 
becomes visible at the two different concepts of virtual reality in industry and aesthetics 
which Daniel Bell has written about,7 the tension between the culture of consumption 
and of the arts in which simulation, play, immediate gratification dominate and the cul-
ture of production and business in which, in contrast, adaptation, rationality and de-
ferred gratification prevail. Bell sees the roots of this contrast in modern times and as an 
unsolvable problem of society.  
Against the thesis of the modern character of the contradiction of the two cultures of 
consumption and production one can reply with Eduard Spranger8 that the cultures of 
consumption and of production are always in contrast in human existence and that this 
contrast of consumption and production cannot be dissolved since both represent neces-
sary sides of human existence.  
A further insight can be gained from the ambivalence of the concept of virtual real-
ity. The virtual world of playing with new possible worlds, the opening and the simula-
tion of new possibilities, must also be present in business if it is to create innovation, 
new products and consumer satisfaction. In an advanced economy both concepts of vir-
tuality have a function. The virtual production in systems of possible reality is in need 
of the artistic virtuality of the imagination of new real possibilities. 
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IV. The Ambivalence of the Virtual Character of the  
Cyberspace and of the Electronic Economy and the Problem of the 
Disembodiment by Virtual Reality 
In the history of ideas, the concept of the virtual has first been developed in theology. 
It is a deeply theological concept. It has been developed in scholastic theology. In the 
theological and philosophical discussion, the ambivalence of the virtual as an invisible, 
yet potent, reality on the one hand and the virtual as mere appearance has been recog-
nised. In this discussion, thinkers saw the necessity to revalidate the real beyond the 
fictitious and simulated. An interesting case of an intensive discussion about the virtual 
was the critique of simulation in the christology of the Gnostic theologians. The prob-
lem of virtual reality and embodiment becomes here apparent in its relevance. The 
Gnostics like Valentinus defended the interpretation that Christ had only an apparent 
body, a simulated or virtual body, as there are also other virtual bodies like those of an-
gels and demons.9 
The thesis that Christ’s incarnation or embodiment was only virtual was criticized as 
follows: If incarnation is the central event of Christianity it cannot be the appearance of 
a virtual body as a simulated human body but it must be a real incarnation. Christ’s 
body must, therefore, have been a real body. The Gnostics defended, however, the opin-
ion that Christ has had only a spiritual flash, a caro spiritalis. Tertullian in turn replied 
in two arguments: First, Christ would not have become a real human if his flesh had not 
been real because humans cannot live separately from their body. Someone who wants 
to become a human must have a body, otherwise he is not a human. If someone has only 
a virtual or apparent body he has not become human in reality. His second argument is 
that the thesis of the virtual reality of Christ’s body negates real and empirical human-
ity: If God had not become a corporeal human he would not have unified himself with 
humanity, he would have unified himself only with the virtual but not with the actual 
humanity. This would imply he has not unified himself with humanity at all.  
For the philosophical discussion of the cyberspace, it is of interest that docetism, the 
theory that the body is only apparent or virtual, represented in the second century the 
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heresy of the hatred or at least the contempt for the body and the flesh. In certain forms 
of the cyberspace and of virtual reality enthusiasm, a certain hatred or at least contempt 
for the corporeal existence of humans becomes visible. The corporeal existence is sub-
ordinated in the cyberworld to the virtual, the spiritual, and technological.  
This is demonstrated in the movie film Matrix. In Matrix, the machines have made 
humanity their subjects by using the human corporeal existence for the mere production 
of energy. The humans, however, who live in a merely virtual cyberspace believe that 
they have a corporeal existence and live a real life in their body. In fact, however, the 
machines manipulated the humans in such a way that the appliances at the brains of the 
humans play a virtual reality to them which they mistake for reality. Their experiencing 
is a virtual reality whereas what is real, the corporeal existence of humans, is used by 
the machines for a completely different objective, the production of energy for the ma-
chines. The humans cannot recognize that the objective of their corporeal and spiritual 
existence is only the production of energy for others anymore. 
The problem of immortality in the internet, or of immortality in a virtual reality, is 
linked to the phenomenon of the disembodiment of human experience in virtual reality. 
The new computer technology is obsessed with the idea to create immortality for the 
humans by the fusion of humans with computers. Bill Joy claims that all the brain data 
of a human should be stored on a chip and that the human body should be replaced by a 
computer that will not cost more than 1000 US $ in the year 2025 he predicts.10 Hu-
mans store themselves on a memory chip and achieve immortality on a hard disc – and 
this at a comparably low amount for which a central European could hardly live de-
cently for one month. Bill Joy quotes Danny Hillis: “I love my body neither more nor 
less than others but if I can become 200 years old in a body made of silicon I will accept 
this body.”11 One could ask here: Why so modest? If we will have created a hard disc as 
our body we will be able to reproduce ourselves in all eternity on computers with the 
appropriate technology.  
One must object that the continuity of the media which consciousness uses for its 
maintenance is not warranted here. We do not know what happens in the instant of a 
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nanosecond in which my self-consciousness moves from my body to the computer. It is 
likely that the continuity of the self as a unity of body and soul will be interrupted in 
this very moment. In modern technology, there is a tendency to devaluate and to aim at 
overcoming the body. 
The technological utopias speak of the project of reconstructing the human and of re-
placing human organs by machines which secure immortality to humans since they be-
come independent from the ageing of the body.12 Such a utopia is only possible if one 
separates thinking, intelligence and consciousness completely from the body and takes 
consciousness to be a incorporeal unity as it was the case in Descartes’ philosophy.13 
Other advanced technologists question, however, exactly this possibility of separating 
the mind from the body. They emphasize the unity of mind and body in contrast to the 
“technological idealism and spiritualism”, that is characteristic of the optimism of the 
artificial intelligence thinkers. 
A computer scientist like Rolf Pfeifer takes the idea to be wrong that intelligence is 
only a quality of computers and brains: Intelligence is not identical with the brain but a 
quality of the whole organism.14 The robotics expert, Rodney A. Brooks, points to the 
fact that intelligence must be linked to the external world. The body is the connection of 
intelligence and consciousness in the human with the external world. Consciousness is 
not only external to the body. Intelligence is in need of the body to be able to interact 
with the world. Brooks speaks about “embodied intelligence”.15 From the need of the 
human to be “embodied intelligence”, it is likely that humans will prefer in the future to 
remain so called MOPs, “Mainly Original Substrate Persons”16 who do not want to 
store their substrate completely in another media, be it the cyberspace or a hard disc. 
The other problem from the point of view of ethics is the price of the project “im-
mortality by machines”. Almost-immortality is, as Jaron Lanier remarks, only likely to 
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be feasible for the ultra rich since the substitution of organs by machines is extremely 
costly. The social inequality caused by extensive organ substitution will be enormous 
since one can assume that all humans will be ready to invest their whole net wealth for 
immortality or will be ready to pay almost every price for it. Within the family, this will 
create considerable problems if parents will invest their whole life income for immortal-
ity. The transfer by inheritance between generations is terminated.  
 
V. Virtual Reality as a Concept of Theological Origin 
The cyberspace and theology share the conviction that the virtual is a third modus of 
being between possibility and reality. Virtuality is possibility as reality. Both, the cyber-
space and theology, share the conviction that the virtual is not only appearance or only 
seeming reality. The virtual as being appearance only would not be interesting at all.  
The latest edition of a dictionary of theology gives the following examples for virtual 
reality under the entry “Virtuality”.17 The first exemple are truths that are only virtually 
and not directly revealed. Virtually revealed truths are those that are not revealed di-
rectly but are gained by conclusions from directly revealed truths. Virtual is secondly 
the virtual distinction in God’s unity, the trinity. Trinity is on the one hand a real dis-
tinctiveness of persons who are however not really distinct since they are three persons 
as unity. The distinction of the three divine persons in trinity is therefore only a virtual 
distinction. Virtual is thirdly God’s acting in creation. Theology calls God’s action in 
creation “virtualiter transeuns”, virtually transcending into the creation.  
The concept of the virtual is used here for the solution of a grave theological prob-
lem. If God is inalterable, but has created the creation he is different or changed after 
having created the creation. One says, however, that God is inalterable. If he is inalter-
able he cannot be a real creator or producer since with the creation something else has 
come into being and God would be altered after the creation, he would have become a 
creator which he was not before the creation. The problem is solved in the following 
way: Since there cannot exist anything that is completely outside of God since this 
would violate God’s unity and perfection, one has to assume that the progression of the 
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creation out of God is only virtually transcending, this progression of the creation from 
God is only virtually transcending. God’s transcendence into creation is only virtual.  
The concept of the virtual transcendent can be used for an analogy for the relation-
ship between humans and the cyberspace. Humans are in a virtually transcendent rela-
tionship with cyberspace since humans created the space without transcending into it. 
The reality of the cyberspace lies on the one hand outside of the social space of human 
relationship since it is invisible and human do not live with their body in this space. On 
the other hand, the human virtual creation belongs to the social space of humans and 
modifies the social space by extending its capabilities and possibilities. The cyberspace 
is a space that lies outside of society and belongs at the same time to the reality of soci-
ety. The cyberspace is only in a virtual, but not in a substantial relationship with the 
world of humans.  
 
VI. The Centrality of the Financial Functions of the  
Cyberspace and the Virtual Reality of the Financial Markets 
  
The virtual financial markets of online banking, of online brokerage and online trad-
ing are most probably the most important and consequential innovation that has been 
produced by the internet. The influence of the internet has been felt most strongly in the 
field of the financial markets since the internet created a completely new capital mar-
ket18 that took over the functions of the traditional stock market, particularly the alloca-
tion of capital, in a more subtle and more direct way for the following reasons: The 
internet enables the public to participate in mass speculation. Mass speculation implies 
that large strata of the population participate in stock market speculation. The internet 
makes this participation possible. It realizes, by way of online trading, a form of peo-
ple’s capitalism that integrates all groups of the population, and not only the classical 
owners of capital, into the capital market. If in the United States today one half of the 
households own wealth in stocks, an enormous change of capital ownership in compari-
son to the traditional distribution of capital income and labor income is caused by this 
                                                 
18   See also P. KOSLOWSKI: „Welche Werte prägen den Kapitalmarkt? Zur Ethik der Spekulation“, in: TH. BUCH-
HEIM, R. SCHÖNBERGER, W. SCHWEIDLER (Eds.): Die Normativität des Wirklichen. Über die Grenze zwischen 
Sein und Sollen, Stuttgart (Klett-Cotta) 2002, pp. 286-311, and J. R. BOATRIGHT: Ethics in Finance, Malden, 
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development. The old “contradiction of capital and labor” is modified by the phenome-
non of a people’s capitalism in which large strata of the population own and can admin-
ister capital via online trading.  
By the extension of the number of capital owners and of those speculating in the 
stock market, an extension of the ability to learn in investment takes place. Far greater 
circles of the population participate in investment decisions compared to former times. 
Banks have recognised that, in the last years, investment banking and financial media-
tion for the capital market have substituted the classical task of loan giving in the bank-
ing business.  
The emerging people’s capitalism will further develop in the future and will increase 
the capacity to learn in capital investment. The precondition for people’s capitalism is 
the internet, since speculation via online trading and with the help of online brokers has 
reduced the transaction costs of stock market speculation considerably. There are, how-
ever, linked some typical problems of virtualisation with online brokerage and online 
trading. They are caused by the virtual reality syndrome, the loss of reality by fictionali-
sation. An example for this developing dangers in online trading is the churning of day 
traders. Churning describes the fact that online trading seduces day traders to buy and 
sell shares too often with the result that they end up with very high transaction costs that 
eat up their capital gains and form an advantage only for the online banks or online bro-
kerage firms to which the day traders pay provision for every transaction. The online 
day traders end up with losses since, even if their shares make profit, they sell and buy 
the shares in their portfolio too often. The provision for the trading firms eat up their 
profits and leave the traders in the end with losses.  
Why is the virtual reality of online trading a problem here? The answer is that in 
online trading the virtual space of action also reduces the corporeal constraints and bar-
riers to such a degree that the trading persons are tempted to trade too often and too eas-
ily. Online trading supports the tendency to take fictions for reality also in the financial 
markets. It is possible to trade anonymously, easily and quickly in the internet whereas 
one had had to go to the bank or to call a person at the bank in order to sell or buy 
shares in former days. Since  too frequent trading might have enervated the broker or 
the bank employee, one would have been hindered by the personal interactions with the  15
financial intermediaries to trade too often. In the anonymous online trading centers 
these barriers have fallen.19  
Another development of great importance for the financial markets made possible by 
the internet is the development of online future markets, the markets for future contracts 
about all kinds of raw materials, currencies, and goods. By the future markets, a new 
comparably low cost insurance against business cycle price fluctuations has become 
possible that is not imaginable without the internet. These insurances against future 
fluctuations of prices can be organized according to groups concerned. Professional 
groups or industries can insure themselves against price fluctuations on future markets 
if the transaction costs for futures will decrease due to the lower transaction costs in-
duced by the internet.  
Fishermen, for example, have the problem that the prices for fish fluctuate and that 
considerable problems can arise for the stabilization of their income. They could insure 
themselves at least partially by way of future contracts about fish and could sell today 
already the fish of the next year. Futures cause costs, of course. The fishermen will not 
receive the full price. The other difficulty is that futures can only insure against business 
cycle fluctuations but not against structural crises if there is, e.g., not enough fish any-
more. In the future market a new field of insurance will be opened that has become pos-
sible through the internet and in which one will observe further innovations. 
One objection frequently raised against the electronic economy is that the share 
prices for the electronic economy have been virtual in the sense of misleading by their 
appearance. The internet firms have been reproached that they have created an atmos-
phere of virtual reality around themselves and in the stock market which has led to 
valuations of these firms in the share market which do not correspond to economic real-
ity and have become themselves simulated or virtual. Robert Hall of Stanford Univer-
sity has introduced the concept of “e-capital”. There is, Hall claims, a surplus in the 
capital value of electronic economy firms that does not show in the balance sheet of 
these firms. The electronic economy accumulates a capital which is not accounted for in 
the normal book-keeping of the assets of electronic economy firms. Many of the inter-
net firms have had price/earnings ratios that have been completely abnormal. How can 
                                                 
19   RICHARD T. DE GEORGE: The Ethics of Information Technology and Business, Oxford (Blackwell) 2003 (= 
Foundations of Business Ethics, Vol. 3), p. 9, calls the phenomenon of the depersonalization of exchange rela-
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this be explained since it contradicts normal valuations of shares? The .com firms 
should have been valuated much lower and their share prices should have fallen earlier. 
Since this had not been the case there must have been something that has caused this 
higher valuation of .com firms. Hall calls the price difference between .com and old 
economy firms the e-capital, a sort of surplus value which the market is not yet able to 
account for properly. 
The question is what happened to this e-capital in the years 2000-2002? It vanished. 
Nevertheless, Hall points to an important point: The potential of the electronic economy 
has not been exhausted yet, its use is still in its beginnings. It is visible today that the 
possibilities of using the electronic economy are enormous. If investors anticipate the 
future potential it is not irrational to say that these firms may be worth more than the 
traditional methods of valuation account for.  
The second argument for this anticipation of future increases in value is that many 
services in the internet are not yet sufficiently priced. There is not an economically suf-
ficient exclusion of users that do not pay. At present, the internet economy includes an 
element of utopia since many of its services are not priced and do not exclude nonpay-
ing users. This utopian element should not be criticized since it creates a space for new 
ideas about using the internet. From the point of view of the economics and the logic of 
the evolution of markets, one must assume that this free uses will be eliminated more 
and more in favor of priced forms of uses since otherwise the enormous investments in 
the internet cannot pay off.  
If one takes into consideration the possibilities that are opened up by the internet it is 
not justified to describe the internet revolution as a bubble of speculation only. Rather, 
it makes sense that the investment in a new technology is larger than it appears to be 
reasonable from the point of view of traditional accountancy. If we draw an analogy 
from natural evolution we find that also natural evolution knows phenomena of evolu-
tionary overspending. Even in the animal world, more is often invested than seems to be 
necessary. This investment happens in order that a new path of evolution can be 
reached. Something similar seems to have happened in the electronic economy. It is too 
early to decide whether the new virtual reality moved here too much in the direction of 
virtual reality as mere appearance or whether a new path of economic evolution has  17
been started by the mass speculation of the beginning people’s capitalism in internet 
shares and by means of online trading. 